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ESSAY

THE NATIVE AMERICAN STRUGGLE BETWEEN
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A CORPORATE
SOLUTION
Joseph Patterson*
INTRODUCTION
Four days following his inauguration, President Donald Trump signed
an executive order “expedit[ing]” the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL),
1
otherwise known as the Bakken Oil Pipeline. This executive order sparked
new rounds of protests by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Oglala Sioux
Tribe, and environmentalists, who opposed the construction of the DAPL for
2
a variety of reasons. The DAPL is a 1,172-mile pipeline, which carries

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Candidate for Masters
in Business Administration, University of Notre Dame, Mendoza College of Business, 2017;
Bachelor of Arts in Economics, Elon University. I thank Professor Daniel Kelly for his
feedback and advice on this Essay.
1 Peter Baker & Coral Davenport, Trump Revives Keystone Pipeline Rejected by
Obama,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/keystone-dakota-pipelinetrump.html?_r=0; see also Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Seeks to Revive Dakota
Access,
Keystone
XL
Oil
Pipelines,
WASH. POST
(Jan.
24,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/01/24/trump-givesgreen-light-to-dakota-access-keystone-xl-oil-pipelines/?utm_term=.d8c4c7ec3797; Madison
Park, 5 Things to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline, CNN (Aug. 31, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/us/dakota-access-pipeline-explainer/.
2 See, e.g., Sam Levin, Last Stand: ‘Water Protectors’ Return to Standing Rock as
Drilling Set to Begin, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/feb/08/standing-rock-dakota-access-pipeline-last-stand;
Blake
Nicholson,
Deadline Looms for Dakota Access Pipeline Protest Camp, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-dakota-access-pipeline-campdeadline-20170220-story.html.
140
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3

crude oil from North Dakota to Southern Illinois. Protests over its
construction began during the summer of 2016, and they continued
4
throughout the remainder of the year. The protests garnered national media
attention, including stories of protesters being sprayed with water in freezing
5
temperatures. On December 4, 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers “denied
a permit for the construction of a key section of the Dakota Access
6
Pipeline.” This was not a permanent ban on the construction of the DAPL,
but rather a temporary decision not to issue an easement to cross Lake Oahe
until the Army Corps of Engineers could prepare an environmental impact
7
statement (EIS).
On January 24, 2017, however, President Trump ordered the Secretary
of the Army to instruct the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works
and the Corps to rescind the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare the EIS and to
consider prior reviews, including the Environmental Assessment and finding
8
of no significant impact, as fulfilling federal law. On February 7, 2017, the
Department of the Army rescinded the NOI, and on February 8, the United
States Army Corps of Engineers granted the necessary easement for the
9
DAPL to cross under Lake Oahe, without performing the EIS. As expected,
the local tribe filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction until after the Corps
10
fulfilled its duty to conduct an EIS.
The plaintiff in the case was the Oglala Sioux Tribe, which is a part of
11
the Great Sioux Nation. It claimed that there was a risk of an oil leak from
3 See Mufson & Eilperin, supra note 1; Alexander Sammon, A History of Native
Americans Protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/09/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-timelinesioux-standing-rock-jill-stein.
4 Mufson & Eilperin, supra note 1; Sammon, supra note 3.
5 See, e.g., Tim Stelloh et al., Dakota Pipeline: Protesters Soaked with Water in
Freezing
Temperatures,
NBC
NEWS
(Nov.
21,
2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dakota-pipeline-protests/dakota-pipeline-protestersauthorities-clash-temperatures-drop-n686581.
6 Nathan Rott & Eyder Peralta, In Victory for Protesters, Army Halts Construction of
Dakota Pipeline, NPR (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/12/04/504354503/army-corps-denies-easement-for-dakota-access-pipeline-saystribal-organization.
7 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:17-cv-267 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Oglala
Complaint].
8 Id.; see also Baker & Davenport, supra note 1 (quoting President Trump: “I am, to
a large extent, an environmentalist, I believe in it. . . . But it’s out of control, and we’re going
to make it a very short process. And we’re going to either give you your permits, or we’re
not going to give you your permits. But you’re going to know very quickly. And generally
speaking, we’re going to be giving you your permits”).
9 See Oglala Complaint, supra note 7, at 3.
10 See id.
11 Id. at 4.
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the DAPL. Because the tribe is located, along with other Native American
tribes, downstream from the easement, it was concerned that if an oil leak
13
were to occur, it would lose access to its clean drinking water. In addition,
it was concerned that an oil leak would destroy the waters, which it considers
14
to be sacred. Therefore, not only were there environmental legal issues
involved, but there were also cultural and religious issues that the tribe
15
claimed were not adequately considered.
Since the protests and lawsuits began during the 2016 summer, the
media attention led to social media protests with hashtags such as
16
“#standwithstandingrock” and “#noDAPL.” The media attention has not,
however, led to a discussion of larger issues faced by the Native American
17
tribes across the United States and even Canada. For example, “[t]he 2
million Natives in the U.S. have the highest rate of poverty of any racial
18
group—almost twice the national average.” Many scholars disagree as to

12 Id. at 16 (“The Tribe is deeply concerned about the risk of a DAPL spill and the
threat that the 570,000 barrels per day pipeline poses to its sacred Treaty- and statute-protected
waters.”).
13 Id. at 16–17 (“A crude oil spill from the DAPL into Lake Oahe would damage the
ecology of the river basin, impair the Tribe’s rights, and contaminate the drinking water of
the Tribe’s citizens.”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2012) (“The Congress hereby finds and
declares that . . . it is the policy of the United States, that all Indian communities and Indian
homes, new and existing, be provided with safe and adequate water supply systems and
sanitary sewage waste disposal systems . . . .”).
14 Oglala Complaint, supra note 7, at 16; see also Angela R. Riley, The History of
Native American Lands and the Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 369, 369 (2013) (“For . . .
indigenous groups—as is a common attribute of indigeneity of similarly situated groups
around the world—this land was and is holy land.”).
15 See Oglala Complaint, supra note 7, at 16, 19.
16 See, e.g., #STANDWITHSTANDINGROCK #NODAPL, ACLU OF KENTUCKY,
http://www.aclu-ky.org/articles/standwithstandingrock-nodapl/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2017);
Standing
Rock
Sioux
Tribe,
FACEBOOK (Mar.
7,
2017,
2:59
PM),
https://www.facebook.com/Standing-Rock-Sioux-Tribe-402298239798452/.
17 See Skiers v the Religious Rights of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples, ECONOMIST (Nov.
24, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21710857-case-supreme-court-willset-noteworthy-precedent-skiers-v-religious-rights (“The nature of [the Ktunaxa First
Nation’s] faith, which assigns sacred value to features of the landscape, poses a puzzle for the
courts. The Ktunaxa maintain that skiers will drive away the grizzly-bear spirit, making their
rituals meaningless. Canada’s Supreme Court must now decide whether that danger
represents an infringement of the religious freedom established by the constitution, and
whether that infringement is justified.”).
18 Naomi Schaefer Riley, One Way to Help Native Americans: Property Rights,
ATLANTIC (July 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/nativeamericans-property-rights/492941/ (“This deprivation seems to contribute not only to higher
rates of crime but also to higher rates of suicide, alcoholism, gang membership, and sexual
abuse. As of 2011, the suicide rate for Native American men aged 15 to 34 was 1.5 times
higher than for the general population.”).
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19

why Native Americans have struggled to achieve economic growth. There
20
are, however, two specific factors that seem to be of particular concern.
First, due to the allotment system that was established in 1877 under the
21
Dawes Act, tribal land has been fractionated to such extreme measures that
22
most of the land is either unused or unnecessarily costly to use effectively.
Second, due to the fact that most tribal land is held in trust by the United
States, Native Americans lack the ability to build equity since they do not
23
hold full property rights.
One problem that Jessica Shoemaker has mentioned in her scholarship
is that most studies try to simplify issues and just address either property

19 See id. (“Many say the federal government is not giving American Indians enough
money to combat these problems. . . . Others—often researchers in the academy—argue that
American culture does not give Natives enough respect, continuing to traffic in stereotypes
when it comes to sports teams and mocking those who claim to have Indian heritage.”); see
also Brian Sawers, Tribal Land Corporations: Using Incorporation to Combat Fractionation,
88 NEB. L. REV. 385, 387 (2009) (“[T]he Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation
Economies identified 2320 individual obstacles in forty major categories. Among the most
frequently cited impediments to economic development are the remoteness of most
reservations, few resources/poor land, burdensome federal regulations, and tribal politics.”
(footnote omitted)).
20 See Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property,
Sovereignty, and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 492 (2017) (“[S]cholars frequently talk
about one issue in isolation—most often fractionation, or sometimes the restrictiveness of the
federal trust status. Other scholarship is focused on historic inequities in the colonial takings
of Indian lands and that history’s impact on the modern race-based inequities in property
distribution in the United States.” (footnote omitted)).
21 General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341–42, 348–49, 354, 381 (2012)).
22 See Jessica A. Shoemaker, No Sticks in My Bundle: Rethinking the Indian Land
Tenure Problem, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 444 (2014) (“Nonetheless, some renewed
recognition of the potential for reinstating informal owner’s use rights on Indian lands, in light
of the expansive needs for housing, income, and development among Indian people, and the
large chunks of unused land theoretically owned by these individuals, has exciting
potential.”).
23 See Jacob W. Russ & Thomas Stratmann, Missing Sticks: Property Institutions and
Income Dissipation in Indian Country 1 (Geo. Mason Univ. Dept. of Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 15-22, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2536597 (“Because new
land owners did not receive possession of their legal titles, they could not sell, gift, mortgage,
or lease their land without approval from the secretary of the interior.”); see also Shoemaker,
supra note 22, at 383 (“This article focuses on another change in individual Indians’ property
rights that has not previously been identified or studied in-depth: the gradual elimination of
any presumptive right of individual Indian owners to use and possess land they jointly own
with one or more co-owners. This modern Indian property rule means that Indian co-owners
of land enjoy no default right to use and possess their own property.”). See generally
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5 (2001) (“[T]he major stumbling block that keeps the rest of
the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce capital.”).
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rights or issues related to fractionated land. Obviously, trying to solve
these problems in isolation is not an adequate solution, because there are so
many moving factors even beyond legal and economic property rights,
25
including the overlap of tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction. In addition
to the complex jurisdictional issues, there are also tribal issues such as
26
cultural preservation and protection of religious land. Therefore, this Essay
recommends a flexible corporate solution that will address many of the
issues mentioned above. The corporate solution proposed is very similar in
nature to a corporate solution proposed by Brian Sawers, in which tribal land
27
corporations purchase fractionated land through eminent domain.
Sawers’s corporate solution is based off of the Rosebud Tribal Land
28
Enterprise, and includes minor changes to improve overall effectiveness.
This Essay will add to Sawers’s corporate solution by discussing how this
solution provides the necessary flexibility to allow Native American tribes
to not only address issues related to fractionated land and the ability to build
equity, but also to preserve their cultural and religious identities.
In Part I, I will provide a brief history of Native American property
rights in order to explain how the current issues have developed over time.
In Part II, I will address the current issues facing Native American economic
growth, in particular the lack of traditional property rights and the
fractionation of their lands. In Part III, I will explain why focusing on just
one of the above issues will not solve the problem, and will offer a corporate
solution that allows enough flexibility to provide tribes with an efficient
model for economic growth.
I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN PROPERTY RIGHTS

Before discussing the history of Native American property rights, it is
important to note that although the United States Constitution does in fact
“contemplate[] the existence of Indian nations” and Native American

24 Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 492 (“Even property law scholarship, if it addresses
Indian land tenure at all, often misses the full picture of the modern Indian land tenure
challenge. For example, scholars frequently talk about one issue in isolation—most often
fractionation, or sometimes the restrictiveness of the federal trust status.”).
25 Id. at 491 (“Tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction swirl together in complex and often
unpredictable ways, and where they apply, federal rules for trust properties tend to be blunt,
deeply bureaucratic, and insensitive to the tremendous diversity among tribal territories and
on-the-ground circumstances.”).
26 Id. at 494 (“Despite all this, however, many indigenous communities in the United
States maintain fundamentally important and diverse relationships with specific physical
places. These connections, many have argued, are critical and foundational to Indian identity,
culture, and even survival.”).
27 See Sawers, supra note 19.
28 See id. at 413–19.
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29

sovereignty, it does not give constitutional rights to Native American
30
tribes. Therefore, when the Supreme Court heard its first case regarding
31
Native American property rights in Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Court was
setting precedent as to what rights Native Americans had to their land as
32
compared to the European settlers.
The Court concluded that Native
Americans had the right to occupy and use their land, but they did not have
the right to transfer or dispose of their land, because “discovery gave
33
exclusive title to those who made it.” This decision laid the groundwork
for the trust system that is currently in place today—and many of the
34
problems associated with the trust system.
The trust system was formally established through the General
Allotment Act of 1877, otherwise known as the Dawes Act, and was only
35
supposed to exist for twenty-five years.
Through this Act, the federal
36
government took tribal lands and held the lands in trust. In turn, the federal
government redistributed this land in allotments to the head of Native
37
American households. The stated purpose of the trust was as follows:
[To] allow Indian landowners who used a “common property” approach
to land to adjust to formal real estate procedures and notions of individual
private property, while relying “upon the government of the United States
to protect their property and personal interests . . . [from] the dubious
38
attempts of self-seeking traffickers in Indian ignorance and credulity.”

29 Riley, supra note 14, at 383; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“The Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes . . .”).
30 Riley, supra note 14, at 383.
31 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
32 See Riley, supra note 14, at 372.
33 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574; see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (“Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, . . .
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.”); TeeHit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) (“It is well settled that in all the
States of the Union the tribes who inhabited the lands of the States held claim to such lands
after the coming of the white man, under what is sometimes termed original Indian title or
permission from the whites to occupy. That description means mere possession not
specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.”).
34 Riley, supra note 14, at 372.
35 General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341–42, 348–49, 354, 381 (2012)); see also
Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 492–93.
36 § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.
37 § 1, 24 Stat. at 388.
38 Jacob W. Russ & Thomas Stratmann, Divided Interests: The Increasing Detrimental
Fractionation of Indian Land Ownership, in UNLOCKING THE WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS
130 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting LEWIS MERIAM ET AL.,
INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 780 (1928)).
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Another reason for the Dawes Act was to force Native Americans to
39
assimilate into U.S. culture. One way in which the government did this
was by selling surplus lands—lands that were not allotted to Native
Americans—to non-tribal members, and checkerboarding these surplus
40
lands with the allotted parcels.
The sale of surplus land led to Native
Americans seeing “roughly 100 million acres of reservation land unilaterally
leave Indian control. . . . The 100 million acres that Indian tribes ceded to
the federal government as surplus land represented roughly two-thirds of
41
their original reservation land base.” In addition to forfeiting the land,
many argue that the federal government sold the more valuable land, leaving
42
the Native American tribes with the less valuable land.
43
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). This
act put a stop to “any further allotment projects,” “placed all individually
owned Indian land and tribally owned land into the federal Indian trust,” and
“indefinitely extended the trust relationship between Indians, their tribes, and
44
the U.S. federal government.”
The Dawes Act and the IRA have had
devastating effects on Native Americans and their property rights, including
45
massive fractionation of tribal lands. This fractionation led to the absurd
reality that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) actually spends more taxpayer
money per year in order to manage some of the parcels than those parcels are
46
able to collect in payments. Therefore, in 1983, Congress passed the Indian
Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), which allowed “the secretary of the interior
to acquire fractional interests in land previously allotted to individual Native
Americans, consolidate them at the tribal level and hold them in trust for the

39 Sawers, supra note 19, at 391 (“[T]his law [was] a mighty pulverizing engine for
breaking up the tribal mass.” (quoting Merrill E. Gates, Addresses at the Lake Mohonk
Conferences (1900), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE
“FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880–1900, at 339–40, 342 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973))); see
also id. (“Allotment was an ‘experiment in social engineering,’ ‘hop[ing] to indoctrinate
Native Americans to the European concept of private ownership.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting MICHAEL L. LAWSON, HEIRSHIP: THE INDIAN AMOEBA 1 (1982) (incorporated as part
of S. 2480–S. 2663: Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
98th Cong., 76–104 (1984)))).
40 Id. at 388.
41 Russ & Stratmann, supra note 38, at 130 (citation omitted).
42 See Sawers, supra note 19, at 395–96 (“To accommodate non-Indian buyers of
surplus land, the best agricultural land and timber were not allotted to Indians.”).
43 Russ & Stratmann, supra note 38, at 130.
44 Id.
45 See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text (discussing how fractionation occurs
and the effects of fractionated land); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987)
(“There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of Indian lands is a serious public
problem.”); Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 493.
46 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 686 (1998).
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47

tribe’s benefit.” The plan was to consolidate “overly fractionated parcels
by providing for small allotment interests to escheat to the tribe on the
48
49
owner’s death.” The Supreme Court in Hodel v. Irving, however, held
that the regulation constituted a taking, and because the regulation did not
50
provide for just compensation, it was unconstitutional. While Hodel was
pending before the Supreme Court, Congress enacted some amendments to
51
section 207 of the ILCA, the escheatment clause. These amendments
required, among other things, that in order for the interest to escheat, it must
be “incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years [following the]
52
53
decedent’s death.” In Babbitt v. Youpee, the Supreme Court again found
54
that section 207 was an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.
II.

CURRENT ISSUES FACING NATIVE AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH

As mentioned above, it is very challenging to pinpoint one reason as to
why Native Americans have the highest rate of poverty of any racial group
55
56
in the United States. It is a very complex issue, and the arguments range
57
from inadequate funding from the federal government, to lack of respect in
58
59
American culture, to traditional property rights. There is no one solution,
and there may be no right solution for all tribes, as will be mentioned below,
but it is important to understand the detrimental effect of the current laws
regulating Native American property rights, and in particular the effect these
laws have had on Native American economic growth.
A. Fractionation of Lands
One of the results of the Dawes Act and the IRA was to limit the ability
60
of Native Americans to transfer their lands. The trust system that resulted
allowed for land transfers “only through devise or, in most cases, through
47 David C. Smith & Dustin T. Greene, The Current Battle Over Native American Land
Allotment, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/779503/the-currentbattle-over-native-american-land-allotment.
48 Heller, supra note 46, at 687.
49 Hodel, 481 U.S. 704.
50 Id. at 717–18.
51 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a) (1994), invalidated by Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
52 Sawers, supra note 19, at 401 (alteration in original) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a)).
53 Babbitt, 519 U.S. 234.
54 Id. at 237; see also Sawers, supra note 19, at 401 (“Note the absurdity in permitting
the federal government to restrict alienation severely during life, but not after death.”).
55 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
56 See Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 489–95.
57 See Riley, supra note 18.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See Heller, supra note 46, at 685.
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intestacy.” Therefore, as land was passed down over time, the parcels were
split into smaller and smaller interests. Without the ability to transfer land,
even amongst each other, individual Indian landowners gradually lost the
presumptive right “to use and possess land they jointly own with one or more
62
co-owners.”
The Supreme Court in Hodel recognized this problem, stating: “The
policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the
Indians. . . . Because the land was held in trust and often could not be
alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew and grew over
63
time.” Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor mentioned one particular
64
“egregious” example, Tract 1305.
Tract 1305 is 40 acres and produces $1,080 in income annually. It is
valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom receive less than
$.05 in annual rent and two-thirds of whom receive less than $1. The largest
interest holder receives $82.85 annually. The common denominator used to
compute fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000. The
smallest heir received $.01 every 177 years. If the tract were sold (assuming
the 439 owners could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be
entitled to $.000418. The administrative costs of handling this tract are
65
estimated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,650 annually.
It is interesting that the Court held that taking the smallest interests at
the time of death would constitute a taking, when the value of that taking is
four percent of a penny. The issue of fractionation, however, is clearly
articulated by Justice O’Connor’s example.
Making the issue of fractionation worse is that allotment “disrupted
Indian ranching, largely because allotments were much smaller than the size
66
of an efficient ranch.” Obviously, fractioning the allotments into smaller
interests each generation would only make this more difficult. Therefore,
organizational costs increase for Native Americans who own an interest in a
67
parcel, and it becomes very inefficient to manage one of these parcels.
Although Congress has been attempting to solve the problem of fractionated

Id.
See Shoemaker, supra note 22, at 383.
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987).
Heller, supra note 46, at 686.
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713; see also Sawers, supra note 19, at 398 n.109 (“Since the
BIA will not issue a check for less than $5, it will take 88,652 years before this heir will
receive payment.”).
66 Sawers, supra note 19, at 394 (“In contrast to the expectations of many non-Indians
about allotment, Indian fears were prescient: allotment ultimately permitted ‘white settlers . . .
[to] monopolize the grazing.’” (alterations in original) (quoting W. H. Clapp, Report of Pine
Ridge Agency, in 1898 ANN. REP. OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 276 (1898))).
67 See id. at 393–99.
61
62
63
64
65
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land since 1983, the efforts have been largely unsuccessful. In 2010, “there
were 154,443 individually owned land parcels on Indian reservations, [and]
because of fractionation the ownership of these parcels [was] split into
69
millions of shared claims.” In an empirical study in 2014, Jacob Ross and
Thomas Stratmann found “that increased ownership fractionation has
reduced the incomes of American Indians on reservations and is associated
70
with lower agricultural lease income, a measure of land productivity.”
B. Lack of Traditional Property Rights
In discussing why fractionation has had a negative impact on the
economic growth of Native Americans, Ross and Stratmann stated that
“[f]ragmented ownership is not a problem as long as property rights are well
71
defined and enforced, and transaction costs are sufficiently low.”
Therefore, it is clear that property rights and fractionated land are both
important when discussing current issues facing Native Americans and
economic growth. But what are the fundamental property rights that Native
Americans are currently lacking?
There are two main traditional property rights that Native Americans
lack, either because of the trust system or due to the fractionated parcels.
First, because the land is actually owned by the federal government in a trust,
Native Americans cannot transfer their interests in the land, except by devise
72
or inheritance. Second, unless an individual owns one hundred percent of
a parcel, they are not able to occupy or use any portion of that parcel, unless
“that individual . . . first receive[s] permission from the other co-owners or
73
obtain[s] a lease approval from the BIA.” With the increase in fractionated
parcels into ever-smaller fractions, receiving the permission from the other
co-owners can obviously be very costly, if not impossible.
Regarding my first point, Hernando de Soto demonstrated in his book,
The Mystery of Capital, “that the major stumbling block that keeps the rest
of the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce
74
capital.” In addition, even when poorer nations have the necessary assets,
“they hold these resources in defective forms: houses built on land whose
ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses

See id. at 399–402.
Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 1.
Id. at Abstract.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 12.
DE SOTO, supra note 23, at 5 (“Capital is the force that raises the productivity of
labour and creates the wealth of nations.”); see also Riley, supra note 18 (“Indians have long
suffered from what the Nobel Prize-winning economist Hernando de Soto has called ‘dead
capital.’”).
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
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with undefined liability, industries located where financiers and investors
75
cannot see them.” Therefore, these assets “cannot readily be turned into
76
capital.” For example, these assets cannot be used to obtain a mortgage, to
77
leverage investments, or as collateral for a loan.
In particular for Native Americans, landowners are not the sole owners
of their land, because the land is technically held as a trust by the federal
78
government. In most cases, this is even more complicated because the
fractionated land parcels have led to landowners not even owning the right
to occupy or possess the land, as discussed below, but rather they own an
79
interest in the proceeds received from the land.
Therefore, these
landowners, or interest owners, cannot “perform ordinary real estate
80
transactions.” This has resulted in Native American landowners, or interest
holders, suffering from the inability to acquire capital—“the major
stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from
81
capitalism.”
In order to fix these problems, some scholars recommend the best
82
solution would be to give the land to the Native Americans. The federal
government could easily transfer the property out of the trust and to the
83
Native Americans. At this point, Native Americans would have the right
to transfer the land to anyone they choose, including non-Native
84
Americans.
In this scenario, the Native American tribes would retain
autonomy over the land, similar to how a city such as New York City retains
85
autonomy over its land.
The problem, however, is that this ignores many of the other issues
86
facing Native Americans. As mentioned above, many indigenous people
SOTO, supra note 23, at 6 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 4.
See Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 520.
Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 4 (“They could not sell, gift, mortgage, or lease
their parcels without approval from the secretary of the interior. Inheritance, the only
mechanism available to alienate an ownership claim, was also limited by allotment policy.”).
81 See DE SOTO, supra note 23, at 5; see also Riley, supra note 18 (“Almost no one on
the reservation can afford to build a home, because no one can get a mortgage. And no one
can get a mortgage because the property on the reservation is held in trust by the federal
government; most of it also is ‘owned’ communally by the tribe. No bank could ever foreclose
on a property, because the bank can’t own reservation land.”).
82 See Riley, supra note 18.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 Id. (“[The land] would remain part of the city, just as no one can sell a part of New
York City to Newark.”).
86 See id. (“There are some First Nations leaders in Canada who are skeptical of this
plan. They worry that it will lead to greater assimilation, which they see as damaging to
75
76
77
78
79
80
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87

view the land as sacred and religious ground.
The city could regulate
through zoning what non-Native Americans do on the land, but they would
still be selling away their sacred land. It could be argued that they do not
have to sell the land; however, this argument is flawed because with the
fractionated parcels many Native Americans would be forced to sell as they
88
would not have enough land to use effectively. Therefore, it would open
up the tribal land to the highest bidder, which would likely not be the Native
American tribes, considering Native Americans currently have the highest
89
rate of poverty of any racial group. In addition, if the land was just given
90
to the tribe from the federal government, as seen in Hodel v. Irving, this
would constitute an unconstitutional taking, unless just compensation was
91
provided.
As to my second point, in order for a co-owner of a parcel to use or
possess part of that parcel, they are required to obtain permission from the
92
other co-owners or to obtain a lease from the BIA. The reason for this is
because “[t]he federal Indian trust prevents reservation land from being
subdivided, which means all inherited ownership claims are for an
93
‘undivided’ interest (i.e. percentage interest) in the entire tract,” rather than
in a specific acreage or portion of the parcel. Therefore, Native Americans
94
lack the most basic rights of co-tenants: to possess and use the property.
The fact that Native Americans do not have a right to possess and use
their property presents a difficulty for the previously mentioned argument—
that if the federal government just returned the land to the Native Americans,
95
they would instantly have access to more capital. This is a problem because
it is not clear as to what land individual landowners would be entitled to
receive. If a current owner of two percent of a parcel were to receive two
percent of the acreage in the parcel, would this make up for their interest?
Additionally, would all acreage be considered of equal quality? More

Native culture. They would be sorry to see a plot of land long occupied by one family sold
to outsiders. Some worry that non-Natives will simply take the land illegally.”). But see id.
(“Moreover, tribes would retain autonomous rule over the land, even if a particular plot passed
into the hands of a non-Native.”).
87 Riley, supra note 14, at 369.
88 See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
89 Riley, supra note 18.
90 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
91 See id. at 707; see also infra notes 132–41 and accompanying text.
92 Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 12.
93 Russ & Stratmann, supra note 38, at 131.
94 See Shoemaker, supra note 22, at 384 (“A defining characteristic of common law
co-ownership forms is the rule that all co-owners of land have an equal and undivided right
to possess the entire estate, concurrently and presumptively, without the prior consent of their
co-owners and typically without any obligation to pay rent for that possession.”).
95 See generally Riley, supra note 18.
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importantly, would two percent of a parcel be enough land to be able to
96
efficiently use the land to make a profit?
At the time of allotment, “the poorest off-reservation ranches ran fifty
97
or more cattle on at least 1000 acres.” The parcels, however, were 160
98
acres for individuals and 320 acres for heads of a household. On a 160acre parcel, an individual could “run seven or eight cattle . . . much too small
99
a herd to compete with non-Indian ranchers.”
In addition, the
undercapitalization, mentioned above, decreased the returns on Native
American farming activities because they did not have the resources to
100
irrigate the land. Therefore, even by providing Native Americans with the
traditional co-tenant rights of possession and use, it is very unlikely that
Native Americans would be able to use their land effectively. In addition,
fractionated land parcels make all of this more challenging and create an
anticommons problem, assuming all of the individual owners were given an
101
“undivided right to possess the whole property.”
For example, if all 439
102
owners of Tract 1305 had an undivided right to possess the entire 40 acres,
103
it would be impossible for any one of them to effectively use the land.
III.

THE CORPORATE SOLUTION

Native Americans should be empowered to make their own decisions
on how best to find a solution that fits all of their concerns. This solution
should include giving Native Americans and Native American tribes more
autonomy over their lands and more control over how that land is allotted
and used. Jessica Shoemaker recommends “grassroots experimentation and
local flexibility” to create “more radical, reservation-by-reservation
104
transformations of local property systems into the future.”
It is very
important that solutions be looked at on a reservation-by-reservation basis
because not all tribes suffer from the same problems. The corporate solution
proposed by Brian Sawers provides this flexibility. This solution allows for
96 See Sawers, supra note 19, at 398 (“In a study of twelve of the eighteen reservations
affected by allotment, the GAO found that 20% of parcels had at least one owner with less
than a 2% interest. Interests of 2% or less constitute two-thirds of the interests recorded and
increased from 305,000 to 620,000 between 1984 and 1992.”).
97 Id. at 394.
98 Heller, supra note 46, at 685.
99 Sawers, supra note 19, at 394.
100 Id.
101 See Shoemaker, supra note 22, at 390; see also Heller, supra note 46, at 687 (“It is
difficult to imagine how Congress or the Native American tribes can overcome the tragedy of
the allotment anticommons. One must wonder how these resources will be returned to
productive use.” (footnote omitted)).
102 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
103 Note that this would be 0.09 acres per person, if divided equally.
104 Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 487.
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a tribal land corporation to purchase fractionated parcels through eminent
domain. Therefore, the corporate solution would solve the issues related to
the current trust system—transferability of land and collateral in the land—
and the issues related to the fractionated land parcels—use and possession of
the land. In addition, the corporate solution gives Native Americans
autonomous control over the land.
A. Examples of Tribal Land Corporations
In order to solve the problem of fractionated lands, former
Commissioner of the BIA John Collier created a test case for a tribal land
105
corporation.
The Rosebud Reservation was home to the Sicangu Oyate
106
Tribe.
The reservation received a corporate charter in 1937, and the
107
Rosebud Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) was created in 1943. At this time,
108
sixty percent of the allotted lands were already fractionated.
The goal of
the TLE was to: “reduc[e] fractionation and help[] Indians acquire
109
economically-sized units of land.”
Individuals who owned an interest in
110
a parcel could tender their interest to the TLE in return for shares.
These
interests were then conveyed to the tribe, but managed by the TLE, in order
111
to further consolidate the management of the land. At the insistence of the
112
tribe, the shares in the TLE were transferable.
Members of the tribe
received Class A shares, which were entitled to a vote, as long as they
remained in possession of a tribal member, and non-tribal holders received
113
Class B shares, which did not include voting rights.
The Rosebud TLE has only been a moderate success, at best. Some
criticize the high costs, claiming that “the TLE has been a ‘black hole for the
114
financial interests of individual certificate holders.’”
Proponents of the
TLE, however, point out that, by 2005 “the TLE had acquired 570,000 acres
of land for the tribe. Each year, the TLE generates $3 million in gross
revenue, of which $2 million is profit. Between $40,000 and $70,000 is
115
spent each month to acquire fractionated interests.”
Sawers, supra note 19, at 414.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 415.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 418 (quoting Views of the Administration and Indian Country of How the
System of Indian Trust Management, Management of Funds and Natural Resources, Might
Be Reformed: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 16 (2005)
(statement of Hon. Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota)).
115 Id. (footnote omitted).
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
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The more recent results stem from the ability of the TLE to economize
116
larger portions of the land.
The TLE relies on voluntary transfers, which
originally led to more checkerboarded interests in the land, and inefficient
117
use of the land. Over time, however, they have been able to acquire more
interests, which allows the TLE to be more effective and enables it to
118
continue to buy more interests.
In addition, the shares have a fixed
119
price.
Originally, it was $1 per share, and the landowners who tendered
120
their interests would receive one share per $1 of appraised value of land.
Over the years, that value was increased, and today, that value is updated on
121
an annual basis.
Therefore, shareholders cannot receive capital gains as
122
easily, since it is only valued once a year.
B. The Cobell Settlement and Federal Buy Backs
The recent success of the TLE shows that an incorporated solution can
benefit Native American tribes by consolidating the land. The federal
government could also assist in this process by returning land to tribes. The
federal government would have to pay just compensation, and when the land
is returned to the tribe, the tribe would then have the ability to incorporate
123
under the Indian Reorganization Act.
First, for tracts such as Tract 1305,
where the cost of administration is greater than the value and the income of
the tract, the federal government can and should buy back the land and return
it to the tribe. For example, Tract 1305 cost $17,650 annually of taxpayer
124
money, when the land is only valued at $8000.
The federal government
should buy back the land, at twice the value, and return it to the tribe. This
would help return the land to tribal control, while simultaneously saving
125
taxpayer money.
In addition, the Cobell settlement in 2009 awarded $1.9 billion to buy
126
back Native American land and return it to the tribes. This was due to the

See id. at 419.
See id. at 418.
See id.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2012)).
124 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987); see also supra notes 64–65.
125 See Riley, supra note 18.
126 Tanya H. Lee, Cobell Land Buy-Back Fund Four Million Acres and Billions of
Dollars
Short,
INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Nov.
14,
2016),
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/politics/cobell-land-buy-back-fund-fourmillion-acres-and-billions-of-dollars-short/.
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
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BIA’s mismanagement of Native American trust funds. This is obviously
a large step in the right direction. It will, however, still leave four million
128
acres of Native American land in a federal government trust.
Based on
the BIA’s past performances in managing this land, it is now time to look for
a solution premised on returning the remaining four million acres to tribal
control and autonomy, while keeping in mind many of the cultural, religious,
and environmental concerns.
C. The Flexibility of the Corporate Solution Moving Forward
The Rosebud TLE was more effective with the more land that it was
able to consolidate. Therefore, the key to a corporate solution is to acquire
as much adjacent land as possible to solve many of the issues related to
129
fractionated parcels.
In addition, the shares of a tribal land corporation
should be transferable, similar to the Rosebud TLE, but they should also not
130
be governed by a fixed price.
Furthermore, the tribal land corporation
should retain voting and non-voting shares, to ensure that tribal lands
continue to protect the interests of the individual tribes. As previously
131
mentioned, the Indian Reorganization Act allows tribes to incorporate.
Tribes, however, have been reluctant to incorporate, which according to
132
Sawers could be due to political disputes among the different tribes.
In order to effectively consolidate as much land as possible, tribal land
133
corporations should use eminent domain. In Hodel v. Irving, the Supreme
Court held that the escheatment clause in the ILCA was an unconstitutional
134
taking without just compensation.
Therefore, the tribal land corporation
would need to prove that the taking was for a public purpose and provide just
135
compensation to the individuals.
The first hurdle, taking for a public
purpose, should be an easy hurdle to overcome. In particular, in Hawaii
136
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court held that a program in
Id.
Id.
See Sawers, supra note 19, at 422.
See id. at 421.
Id. at 409.
See id. at 410.
See id. at 421–25.
Id. at 400; see also id. at 423 (“Tribes are subject, however, to the Indian Civil Rights
Act; Section 1302(5)(8) mirrors the language of the Fifth Amendment.” (footnote omitted)).
135 Id. at 423.
136 467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 481–82
(2005) (“In [Midkiff], the Court considered a Hawaii statute whereby fee title was taken from
lessors and transferred to lessees (for just compensation) in order to reduce the concentration
of land ownership. We unanimously upheld the statute and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view
that it was ‘a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the property of A and
transfer it to B solely for B’s private use and benefit.’” (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235)).
127
128
129
130
131
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133
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which land was taken from lessors and given to lessees to solve a
137
concentrated land tenure problem constituted a valid public purpose.
Similar problems arise from the fractionation of land, leading to
138
“environmental degradation, poverty, and unemployment.”
Therefore, it
appears the Supreme Court would uphold the taking of tribal land as a public
purpose.
Proof of just compensation presents a separate hurdle. Brian Sawers,
139
however, presents an interesting solution to this problem.
As previously
mentioned, tribes lack the capital to buy back the land themselves, and it is
important that tribes keep control and autonomy over the land. Therefore,
tribes should offer shares in consideration of interests in land, similar to the
Rosebud TLE. For any individual who does not wish to receive shares, they
140
should be paid-in-kind. In particular, they should receive a similar interest
141
in another parcel. This will allow the corporation to take full control over
142
the majority of parcels,
while leaving a few parcels in trust for the
individuals who do not wish to tender.
The benefits of putting the land in a corporation is to allow for a more
efficient use of the leasing of property, while retaining the control and
autonomy of the land for the tribes. In addition, the transferability of the
shares allows the individual interest holders to acquire additional capital as
collateral, and the floating price allows for additional capital gains to interest
holders. By providing just compensation as like-kind property, this solves
the holdout problem, because it allows the few holdouts to keep their
fractionated interest, just in a parcel not controlled by the corporation. In
addition, it would decrease the fractionated parcels, and place the
fractionated parcels near each other, while allowing the remainder of the land
to be used effectively. Additionally, instead of using traditional fiduciary
responsibilities, such as increasing shareholder value, it could be added to
the bylaws or the charter that the fiduciary duties extend to the tribe as a
143
whole. Therefore, the voting members, only tribal members, can still elect
to consider environmental issues, religious issues, and cultural issues
throughout the corporate decision-making process. Additionally, this should
help with the concern of assimilation and preserving Native American
culture, because the corporation will have control over decisions such as land
use.
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229–30; see also Sawers, supra note 19, at 423.
Sawers, supra note 19, at 423.
See id. at 409.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403 (“Seventy percent of heirs contacted by the test program volunteered to
sell their interests, indicating that fractionation could be significantly reduced through
voluntary purchase.”).
143 See id. at 410.
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138
139
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The corporate solution presented in this section is similar to the tribal
144
land corporation discussed by Brian Sawers.
The key benefits of this
solution is it fixes the two main problems that have resulted in the lack of
economic growth by Native American tribes: issues related to the current
trust system—transferability of land and collateral in the land—and the
issues related to the fractionated land parcels—use and possession of the
land.
In addition, the corporate solution gives Native Americans
autonomous control over the land. It allows for flexibility amongst tribes,
and allows tribes to maintain their religious and cultural identities.
CONCLUSION
While the easy solution to Native American property rights would be to
just return the land to the Native Americans and give them the “full bundle”
of property rights, this does not solve the entire problem. Native Americans
view their land as sacred and they are also very interested in preserving their
cultural identity. Historically, the federal government attempted to force
Native American assimilation. The result, however, was fractionated lands
145
that the Supreme Court has deemed a disaster.
Therefore, there needs to
be a more flexible solution to the property rights issue and fractionation
issues. For example, by returning the property to individuals with interests
in the land, this would not solve the problem of fractionation, when so many
individuals own two percent or smaller fractions of a parcel. This would
lead to many individuals selling their interests to non-tribal members and the
tribe would lose much of its autonomy.
The corporate solution protects this autonomy, while still giving Native
American tribes the control of the land. It allows for tribes to make their
own decisions on what factors are most important to the tribe. In addition,
it would provide a strong, united backing to help fight against what they see
as dangers to their sacred land. A tribal land corporation would be able to
use the resources and capital that it has gained through the consolidated land
interests to fight back against a proposed pipeline, such as the DAPL, that
might threaten their access to clean water and might damage their sacred
land. The original route of the DAPL was to go through Bismarck, North
Dakota, a wealthier city than the Native American reservations, but was later
146
rerouted by the Corps due to environmental concerns.
As previously
mentioned, the Corps has not conducted an EIS on the new route, and it
would be interesting to see if a consolidated, capital rich tribal corporation

See id.
See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987) (“The policy of allotment of Indian
lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians.”).
146 See Catherine Thorbecke, Why a Previously Proposed Route for the Dakota Access
Pipeline Was Rejected, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/previouslyproposed-route-dakota-access-pipeline-rejected/story?id=43274356.
144
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could have prevented the Corps from granting an easement for the DAPL
under Lake Oahe.

